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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Re8pondent, 
vs. 
STANLEY MOZLEY PERKINS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 9077 
APPELLANT~s BRIEF 
S'TATEMENT OF FA·CT 
This is an appeal from a case originating in 
the Salt Lake City Court wherein the District Court, 
after a trial de novo, entered a judgment of convic-
tion to the charge of driving an automobile while 
under the influence of intox'icating liquor. The only 
question that can now be p1~operly determined by 
the Supreme Court is that which involves the val-
idity or constitutionality of a statute. In other cases, 
of course, the decision of the Distt~ict Cou1'1s on such 
appeals is final. 
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In this case, appellant was arl~ested on Octo--
ber, 27, 1958 at Salt La.kc City, Utah and was in-
duced to submit to a blood alcohol test without hav .. 
ing been offered the choice of the alternative tests 
under Section 41-6-44.10 of the Laws of 1957, (R. 
21) . ·The arresting officer on direct examination 
testified that he asked appellant if he would submit 
lo a blood alcohol test and testified that ''after, 
when we finally got to the County Hospital, he fi-
nally consente~ yes.. At that time he didn't say 
Hyes" 01~ '~no}', he wanted more advice to it.'' (R. 
14). On cross examination the arresting officer 
advised that he had a continual conversation '\Vith 
appellant from the time of a1·rest to time of taking 
appellant to the police station and then to the Salt 
Lake County Hospital and stated that appellant 
refused at first to take the blood test. (R .. 19). 
Appellant wanted to know what his rights were and 
the arresting officer at no time told ·him that he 
had the alternativ·e choice of several tests under the 
statute above referred to. The arresting officer, in 
attempting to explain to appellant what his rights 
were stated in substance that if he didn't take the 
blood tests that it was the procedure on refusal that 
his license would be re,roked. ( R. 20) .. 
Further, the arresting officer did ndt advise 
appellant that he had the right to have his physi-
cian take a ·blood test in addition to the test taken .. 
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The arresting officer was not aware that appellant 
had such a right.. ( R. 20) . 
It is clear that the arresting officer at no time 
mentioned any other type other than the blood test 
to defendant. (R. 21), 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POll\~ I 
SECTION 41-6-44.10 LA,VS OF UTAH~ 1957, GNDER 
\VHICH APPELLANT WAS INDUCED TO SUBMIT TO 
BLOOD TEST JS IKV ALID AND UNOONSTJTU-
TJONATJ. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 41-6-44.10 LA\VS OF UTAH, 1957, UNDER 
WHICH APPELLANT \VAS INDUCED TO SUBMIT TO 
BLOOD TEST IS lNV ALID AND UNCO~STITU­
TIONAL. 
Appellant contends that the statute in question 
constitutes a violation of the state and federal con-
stitutional provisions. Indeed, this court has only 
recently announced that it has ~'grave doubts as to 
the validity of the statute4 '~ Ri1tg-u;ood vs. State, 
8 Utah (2d) 287, 33 P. 2d 943~ At least, the original 
opinion filed herein so indicated. 
Tlhe statute, of course, provides that a driver 
is deemed to give his consent to a chemical test of 
his breath, blood, urine OI' saliva for the purpose of 
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determining the alcoholic content of his blood, etc. 
This court in the case of Rin-gtttood vs. State, su-pra, 
held that 'the intent of the statute \Vas that the sub-
ject could comply by giv-ring a test of anyone of the 
substances. In that case, as in the present case, the 
officer confronted the drivel~ with the choice that he 
must give his blood fot~ the test or his license would 
be revoked. This court held that such procedure was 
not in acco1·dance with the requirements of the 
statute and thei·e was no valid basis fo1.j revoking 
of the license. ';vhile, of course, the facts of this 
case are at variance with those of the Ringu•ood 
case, we respectfully su·bmit and m~ge that under 
the circumstances of the present case the evidence 
as obtained by the illegal procedure under the above 
statute should not ·be available to respondent to 
sustain the conviction. In other words, appellant 
contends that because of the failure of respondents 
to comply with the terms of the statutet i.e.~ to give 
the alternative choices of the type of test least ob-
j ec'ti onable to appellant, that it res ul'ts in an un-
constitutional application of the statute in question, 
and is invalid as to appellant, even though no pro-
ceedings were taken thereunder to revoke appel-
lant's license. 
It should ·be noted tha't the arresting officer 
engaged the appellant in almost continual conver-
sation and admitted that appellant at first refused 
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to consent to any blood test and after purportedly 
advising the appellant as to what his rights were, 
(R. 19-20), the arresting officer finally brought 
the ma=tter up for decision and appellant finally 
consented (R. lti-20). The officer utterly and mis-
era·bly failed to carry out the intent and purpose 
of the statute which definitely and absolutely af-
fected appellant's rights by the unlawful applica-
tion of the statute. It is not a question alone of de-
fendant~s guilt or innocence, but of the illegal and 
inept manner in \vhich law officers have ·been al-
lowed to use coercion by insisting that the accused 
must submit to a blood test or thai his driver's 
license would be revokecL 
CO~CLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that a decision as 
to the validity of Section 41-6-44.10 Laws of -ctah, 
1957 in its application to the facts at hand, should 
have been made in the District Court, and in any 
event the Supreme Court should declare said sta-
tute unconstitutional and invalid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERL C. RITCHIE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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